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Treaty Bodies and the
Interpretation of Human Rights
Kerstin Mechlem*

ABSTRACT

The eight United Nations human rights treaty bodies play
an important role in establishing the normative content of
human rights and in giving concrete meaning to individual
rights and state obligations. Unfortunately, their output often
suffers from methodological weaknesses and lack of coherence
and analytical rigor, which compromise its legitimacy.
This Article suggests that these deficits could in large part
be addressed if the committees applied the customary legal rules
of interpretation codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), which
requires attention to the text, context, and object and purpose of
a treaty, in a much more systematic manner than currently
practiced.
The argument will be made in three steps. After an
Introduction (Part I), Part II provides the necessary
background. It sets out the Vienna Convention rules of
interpretationand provides an overview of the treaty bodies. It
shows that despite their various functions, the treaty bodies are
legal bodies that are well equipped to apply legal rules of
interpretation. Part III suggests that the application of legal
rules of interpretation is an obligation as much as a necessity.
It makes two main arguments: The first is that the treaty bodies
are bound to apply Articles 31 and 32 because of a formal
reason-namely, because they interpret human rights treaties
largely in lieu of states. As states would be bound by the Vienna
Convention rules, the treaty bodies have to adhere to them as
well. The second argument is a substantive one. As the treaty

* Lecturer in Human Rights and International Law, Transitional Justice Institute,
University of Ulster, UK. An early draft of this paper was presented at a conference on
'Methods of Human Rights Research" organized by the Maastricht Centre for Human
Rights in November 2007. The Author would like to thank Professor Fionnuala Ni
AolAin and Professor David Kretzmer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this article. All errors remain the Author's responsibility.
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bodies' output is nonbinding, its de facto legal force and impact
depends on how convincingly and persuasively it is argued,
which in turn is significantly shaped by the consistent use of an
accepted and appropriate method. This sub-part will discuss
the legal dimension of each of the treaty bodies' main activities
and the role legal interpretationplays for each. It argues that
when treaty bodies interpret rights and obligations under a
treaty, the use of a legal method of interpretationis necessary to
make their work comprehensible, rational, predictable,
legitimate, reproducible, and faithful to the principles of legal
certainty and the rule of law. Part IV serves to illustrate the
relevance of the abstract argument made before by discussing in
detail three examples from the work of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR): the CESCR's
views on (1) the obligations of internationalorganizationsunder
the International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR); (2) direct extraterritorialobligations;and (3)
core obligations. In each example, one of the three requirements
of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention-text, context, or object
and purpose-has been neglected. Part IV demonstrates how
such neglect has led to unconvincing results that have
undermined the value, credibility, and usefulness of the work of
the treaty bodies, thereby causing a possible weakening rather
than strengthening of the human rights system. The Article
closes with conclusions and recommendations developed from
the analysis (PartV).
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I. INTRODUCTION

The eight human rights treaty bodies or committees fulfill a
number of vital functions in the human rights system. 2 They
supervise states parties' compliance with their obligations under a
treaty, monitor progress, and provide public scrutiny on realization
efforts.
They assist states in assessing achievements and in
identifying implementation gaps. They try to induce changes to the
law, policy, and practice in member states and provide guidance on

1.
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), Human Rights Committee (HRC), Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), Committee against Torture (CAT), Committee on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), and Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Human Rights Bodies, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/
HumanRightsBodies.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). There is also a Subcommittee on
Prevention established under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture
and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Id. A Committee
on Enforced Disappearances (CED) will be established once the Convention on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance enters into force. International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance art. 26(1),
Dec. 20, 2006, 14 IHRR 582, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
disappearance-convention.htm#26
[hereinafter
Convention
Against
Enforced
Disappearance].
2.
For recent works dealing with the human rights treaty body system, see
U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Final Report of the Independent Exert on Enhancing
the Long-Term Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (Mar. 27, 1997) (prepared by Philip Alston); THE FUTURE OF UN
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000);
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
JAKOB TH. MOLLER (G. Alfredsson et al. eds., 2001); THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000); THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2001).
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the measures needed to realize rights at the national level. They
stimulate and inform national human rights dialogue. Some treaty
bodies afford individual redress. The committees' rather technical
and legal work complements the more politically driven activities of
other human rights actors, notably the Human Rights Council. And
finally, the committees interpret the treaties they supervise in order
to discharge their mandate of monitoring states parties'
They thereby play an important role in
implementation. 3
establishing the normative content of human rights and in giving
concrete meaning to individual rights and state obligations. This role
extends beyond the parties to a treaty, promoting the general
understanding of a particular right at the national and international
level by states, NGOs, academia, and others.
Given the importance of the treaty bodies' interpretative output
for the clarification and development of human rights law, including
customary human rights law, it seems self-evident that the bodies'
interpretations should be based on the coherent use of an appropriate
and accepted method to make them rational and legitimate. The use
of such a method distinguishes legitimate determinations of the
meaning of a legal rule from arbitrary and random findings.
Unfortunately, method does not always play a strong role in the
treaty bodies, as recent General Comments by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) show. 4 As part of an
ongoing debate about the treaty bodies, commentators also regularly
criticize a lack of substantial arguments, coherence, and analytical
rigor; the absence of a visible concept of interpretations; and the
existence of contradictory remarks by different committee members,
5
which are caused by the absence of a principled approach.
These deficits are typically attributed to the facts that the treaty
bodies fulfill more varied functions than courts and are composed of
multidisciplinary teams of experts instead of only legal practitioners.
However, such deficits not only lower the prestige of the committees
and make it easier for states and other actors to ignore their output,
but also decrease their capacity to effectively carry out their
functions. As the number of treaty bodies increases 6 and treaty
bodies assume new functions-such as the CESCR, which is likely to

3.
See, e.g., Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHRI, In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Plan of
Action Submitted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annex,
95, U.N. Doc A/59/2005fAdd.3 (May 26, 2005).
See infra Part IV.
4.
See, e.g., Roland Bank, International Efforts to Combat Torture and
5.
Inhuman Treatment: Have the New Mechanisms Improved Protection?,8 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 613, 631-35 (1997).
6.
See infra Part Il.B.1.
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7
be able to pronounce on violations in individual cases in the future addressing these challenges becomes more and more pressing.
This Article suggests that concerns could largely be addressed if
the committees applied the customary legal rules of interpretation
codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention), which requires attention to the text,
context, and object and purpose of a treaty, in a much more
systematic and coherent manner than currently practiced.8 The
Article argues that the application of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention by the treaty bodies is both an obligation under
international law and a substantive necessity to ensure that the
treaty bodies have forceful impact and live up to their specific
responsibilities. The Article focuses on the treaty bodies' role in
interpreting the rights and obligations of their respective treaties and
distinguishes this role from their wider mandate in policy matters.
Adhering to Articles 31 and 32 Vienna Convention does not exclude
economic, social, developmental, and other considerations.
The argument will be made in three steps. Part II provides the
necessary background, setting out the Vienna Convention rules of
interpretation and providing an overview of the treaty bodies. It
shows that despite their various functions, the treaty bodies are legal
bodies well equipped to apply legal rules of interpretation. Part III
suggests that the application of legal rules of interpretation is an
obligation as much as a necessity.
This Part offers two main
arguments. First, the treaty bodies are bound to apply Articles 31
and 32 because of a formal reason, namely because they interpret
human rights treaties largely in lieu of states-the states would be
bound by the Vienna rules, so the treaty bodies have to adhere to
them as well. The second argument is a substantive one. Because
the treaty bodies' output is nonbinding, its de facto legal force and
impact depends on how convincingly and persuasively it is argued,
which in turn is largely shaped by the consistent use of an accepted
and appropriate method. This sub-part discusses the legal dimension
of each of the treaty bodies' main activities and the role of legal
interpretation for each. It mainly argues that when treaty bodies

7.
On June 18, 2008 the Human Rights Council adopted by consensus an
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) and recommended that the General Assembly adopt and open it for
signature, ratification and accession in March 2009. U.N. Human Rights Council Res.
8/2, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/2 (June 18, 2008), available at http://ap.ohchr.org
documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRCRES_8_-2.pdf. On December 10, 2008, the
General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR and recommended
that it be opened for signature at a signing ceremony to be held in 2009. G.A. Res
63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 18, 2008).
8.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, S. EXEc. Doc. L,
92-1 (1970), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
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interpret rights and obligations under a treaty, use of a legal method
of interpretation is necessary to make their work comprehensible,
rational, predictable, legitimate, and reproducible, and to do justice to
the principles of legal certainty and of the rule of law. Part IV serves
to illustrate the relevance of the abstract argument by discussing in
detail three examples from the work of the CESCR: the CESCR's
views on (1) the obligations of international organizations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR); (2) direct extraterritorial obligations; and (3) core
obligations. In each example one of the three requirements of Article
31 of the Vienna Convention-text, context, or object and purposehas been neglected. Part IV demonstrates how such neglect has led
to unconvincing results that have undermined the value, credibility
and usefulness of the work of treaty bodies, thereby causing a
possible weakening rather than strengthening of the human rights
system. The study of the three examples underscores the need for the
coherent application of the method prescribed by Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention. Part IV also suggests how the CESCR could
have addressed the same topics in a more legally convincing way
without compromising the legitimacy of its interpretations. The
Article closes with conclusions and recommendations developed from
the analysis (Part V).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Rules of InterpretationUnder the Vienna Convention
The rules of customary international law codified in Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention 9 provide the starting point for the

9.

Article 31 GeneralRule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
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10
Article 31(1)
interpretation of treaties under international law.
contains the basic rule of interpretation. It establishes that a treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith and that the ordinary meaning of its
terms, its context,11 and its object and purpose are the three relevant
factors of interpretation. Text, context, and object and purpose must

be viewed together, and none may be given greater weight than the
12
others.
The ordinary meaning of a treaty text is the logical starting point
The ordinary meaning must be considered3
for interpretation.
together with the context, the object, and the purpose of the treaty.'
"Context" refers to material related to the conclusion of the treaty,
according to Article 31(2). 14 Also, as per Article 31(3), subsequent
agreements regarding the interpretation of a treaty or the application
of its provisions, subsequent practice in the application, and any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
15
the parties shall be taken into account together with the context.

(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that
the parties so intended.
Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of
its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning, resulting from the
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, arts. 31-32.
Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 4, 41
10.
(Feb. 3); ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 186 (2000); Rudolf
Bernhardt, Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention of
Human Rights, 42 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L 11, 13 (1999); Rudolf Bernhardt, Interpretation
in International Law, in 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1416
(Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995) (providing an extensive bibliography); cf. Golder v. UK, 18
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14, § 29 (1975) (stating that articles 31 and 32 provide
"generally accepted principles of international law"). All human rights bodies apply
articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. See FLORIAN REINDEL, AUSLEGUNG
MENSCHENRECHTLICHER VERTRAGE AM BEISPIEL DER SPRUCHPRAXIS DES UNMENSCHENRECHTSAUSSCHUSSES, DES EUROPAISCHEN UND DES INTERAMERIKANISCHEN
GERICHTSHOFS FOR MENSCHENRECHTE [THE INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS] (1995). On the law of treaties in general, see AUST, supra; T.O. ELIAS, THE
MODERN LAW OF TREATIES (1974).
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31(2).
11.
AUST, supra note 10, at 185.
12.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31(1).
13.
Id. art. 31(2)(a).
14.
Id. art. 31(3).
15.
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As discussed below, the treaty bodies and states parties jointly
generate subsequent practice. The third element is the object and
purpose of the treaty.
This element requires seeking the
interpretation that is most appropriate in order to realize the aims
and achieve the object of a treaty, rather than that which would
16
restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations of the parties.
The overarching object and purpose of human rights treaties is the
protection of the rights of individuals, although certain other values,
such as the security and integrity of the state, are safeguarded
through derogation and limitation clauses. 17 Unlike other treaties in
international law, human rights treaties are not concluded to
accomplish a reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of
the parties to a convention' s but are geared toward third-party
beneficiaries. 19
This special characteristic requires that these
treaties are interpreted in a manner sufficiently favorable to the
20
effective protection of individual rights.
Article 32 adds that recourse may be had to supplementary
means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty

16.
Wemhoff v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 55, 75
(1968).
17.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
pmbl., 993 U.N.T.S 3 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR] ("[I]n accordance with the
principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."); Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, The
Emergence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence,19 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 101, 107 (1995) (describing how human rights conventions recognize threats to
stability and order by providing derogation clauses).
18.
The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American
Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 2,
29 (Sept. 24, 1982); Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts.
4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A), No. 3, 50 (Sept. 8, 1983).
19.
There is, however, also a common interest of states in the contribution that
human rights make to freedom, justice and peace in the world as well as to peaceful
and friendly relations among nations. U.N. Charter art. 55; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16,
1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; ICESCR, supra note 17, pmbl.; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183rd plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A1810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
20.
Cf. MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 3 (1995) (noting
that terms of a human rights treaty should be interpreted such that they are favorable
to the individual, with limitations and restrictions interpreted narrowly). This
approach is sometimes called a "teleological approach." D. MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE-ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 159 (1991); Philip Alston & Gerald Quinn,
The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations Under the InternationalCovenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 161 (1987). This is
somewhat misleading as it is not a separate method of interpretation but the
application of the obligation to take the object and purpose of a treaty into account.
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and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine
the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31 leaves
the meaning ambiguous, obscure, or leads to a result that is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 2 1 Article 32 also assigns a
supplementary role to the travaux prdparatoires,although in practice
22
they remain very relevant.
The application of the method of interpretation set out in
Articles 31 and 32 provides significant flexibility. Indeed, it has been
aptly stated that the interpretation of legal documents is to some
extent an art, not an exact science. 23 The method thereby provides a
suitable and flexible framework to assess whichever questions the
human rights committees are confronted with. At the same time, it
provides sufficient guidance to lead to legitimate interpretative
results and to enable the development of a coherent body of
committee jurisprudence.
B. Treaty Bodies as Legal Bodies
Compared with the political bodies of the human rights system,
on which states are represented, the treaty bodies are, also according
to their chairpersons, 24 "legal bodies ''25 staffed by independent and
impartial experts 26 who engage in "norm-to-fact decision making"
with limited discretion, as they are bound by the terms of the treaty
they apply. 27 Members of treaty bodies have characterised their work
as "legal examinations. ' 28 This fact is underscored by the fact that
three treaties-the ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture, and the
Convention Against Enforced Disappearances-explicitly require
interpreting bodies to give consideration to the "usefulness of the

21.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 32.
22.
AUST, supra note 10, at 197.
23.
Report of the Int'l Law Comm. on the Work of Its 16th Session, U.N. GAOR,
19th Sess., Supp. at 200, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/173 (July 11, 1964), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a-cn4-l73.pdf ('The interpretation of
documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science.").
24.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Chairpersonsof the Human Rights
8, submitted to the General
Treaty Bodies on Their Nineteenth Meeting, Annex,
Assembly, UN Doc. A/62/224 (Aug. 13, 2007).
25.
Henry Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What
Role for the Human Rights Committee, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING, supra note 2, at 15, 49.
26.
Id.
27.
See id. for further differences between the political bodies of the human
rights system and the treaty bodies.
Rosalyn Higgins, Ten Years on the UN Human Rights Committee: Some
28.
Thoughts Upon Parting,6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 570, 580 (1996).
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participation of some persons having legal experience. '29 As will be
shown, the treaty bodies are well equipped to apply legal rules of
interpretation.
1.

Overview of the Treaty Bodies

There are currently eight treaty bodies in the UN human rights
system: the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) for the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination; the Human Rights Committee (HRC) for the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the
CESCR; the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women; the Committee Against Torture
(CAT) for the Convention Against Torture; the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) for the Convention on the Rights of the
Child; the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) for the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; and the recently
established Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities.3 0
Another committee, the Committee on Enforced
Disappearances (CED), will be established once the Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance enters
into force. 3 1 In addition, there is a Subcommittee on Prevention
established under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
32
Punishment.
Other than the CESCR, all treaty bodies are or will be created in
accordance with the provisions of the treaties they monitor. The
CESCR was established by ECOSOC, as the ICESCR does not
33
provide for a treaty body to monitor compliance with its provisions.

29.
ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 28(2); Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 17(1), S. TREATY Doc. No.
100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (Dec. 10, 1984), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/cat.htm#part2 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; Convention
Against Enforced Disappearance, supranote 1, art. 26(1).
30.
See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Human Rights
Bodies,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRights
Bodies.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
31.
Convention Against Enforced Disappearance, supra note 1, art. 26(1).
32.
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2, Dec. 18, 2002, G.A. Res.
57/199, U.N. Doc. AIRES/57/199, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/catone.htm.
33.
For a detailed account of the background to the CESCR's establishment,
see CRAVEN, supra note 20, at 35; Philip Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges
Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 9
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As a subsidiary organ of ECOSOC, the CESCR reports to its parent
body and is a United Nations organ. 34 It is, however, independent
and impartial and has, like the other treaty bodies, experts as
members.
Membership of the treaty bodies varies between 10 (CAT, CRC,
CMW, and CED) and 23 (CEDAW) members, with the CRPD (12-18
members), the CERD, the HRC, and the CESCR (18 members each)
36
taking a middle position.3 5 States nominate their own nationals,
and members are elected by the parties to a treaty, except in the case
of the CESCR, whose members are elected by ECOSOC. 37 Members
serve in their personal capacity; i.e., they are neither representing
their states nor following government instructions but serve as
independent experts. Nonetheless, some members hold government
offices to which they return outside sessions, which may cast a
shadow of doubt on their full independence.
The criteria for the composition of the treaty bodies are
established by the text of each treaty, and, in the case of the CESCR,
by the ECOSOC Resolution. Whereas there are some variations in
language, typical requirements are high moral standing and
recognized competence in the field of human rights 38 or the specific

HUM. RTS. Q. 332, 335-49 (1987). When the ICESCR entered into force on January 3,
1976, no supervision system was in place. In arts. 16-22 the ICESCR provides only for
a rather obscure reporting procedure that leaves many questions open as to the exact
nature, purpose, and manner of the supervision foreseen. ICESCR, supranote 17, arts.
16-22. ECOSOC therefore had to develop arrangements to ensure effective
supervision. It established first a Sessional Working Group on the Implementation of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. U.N. Econ. &
Social Council [ECOSOC] Decision 1978/10 (May 3, 1978). It was later renamed the
"Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts" and was replaced by a committee
of independent experts (the CESCR) in 1985. U.N. Econ. & Social Council [ECOSOC]
Res. 1985/17, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/1985/85 (May 28, 1985), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/
documents/E/ECOSOC/resolutions/E-RES-1985-17.doc. The Sessional Working Group
was renamed the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Id. Its
procedures and methods of work have remained in force. Id. at 3.
34.
Alston, supra note 33, at 350.
35.
On the requirements for membership in the treaty bodies, see Craig Scott,
Bodies of Knowledge: A Diversity Promotion Role for the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING, supra

note 2, at 403.
36.
This is a requirement under all treaties except the ICESCR, where it has
nevertheless become practice. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 8(2), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm.
37.
ECOSOC Res. 1985/17, supranote 33, at 2.
38.
See Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, art. 17(1); Convention
Against Enforced Disappearance, supra note 1, art. 26(1); cf. International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 36, art. 8(1)
(requiring only high moral standing); ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 28(2); ECOSOC Res.
1985/17, supra note 33, at 1 (requiring only competence in the field of human rights).

916

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRAN5NATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:905

subject-matter of the respective treaty. 39 Other criteria to be taken
into account in the election process are equitable geographical
distribution 4 and the representation of different forms of
civilization 4 ' and of the principal legal systems. 42 The ECOSOC
Resolution also requires different forms of social systems, 43 and the
Convention on Persons with Disabilities and the Convention on
Enforced Disappearances mention gender balance. 44 In addition, the
ICCPR, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance explicitly
45
refer to the participation of legal experts.

39.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 34(3), Dec. 13,
2006, 46 I.L.M. 443, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/disabilitiesconvention.htm; International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families art. 72(1), Dec. 18, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1517, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm#p7 [hereinafter CMW]; Convention on the
Rights of the Child art. 43(2), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women art. 17(1), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cedaw.htm.
40.
Convention Against Enforced Disappearance, supra note 1, art. 26(1);
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 39, art. 34(4);
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 39, art. 43(2); Convention Against
Torture, supra note 29, art. 17(1); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, supra note 39, art. 17(1); ICCPR, supra note 19, art.
31(2); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, supra note 36, art. 8(1); ECOSOC Res. 1985/17, supra note 33, at 2; see
also CMW, supra note 39, art. 72(2) ("[IJncluding both States of origin and States of
employment.").
41.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 39, art.
34(4); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
supra note 39, art. 17(1); ICCPR, supranote 19, art. 31(2); International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 36, art. 8(1).
42.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 36, art.
34(4); CMW, supra note 36, art. 72(2); Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra
note 39, art. 43(2); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women supra note 39, art. 17(1); ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 31(2);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 36, art. 8(1); see also ECOSOC Res. 1985/17, supra note 33, at 2 (taking into
account "different forms of legal systems"). The formulations are similar to the one of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which makes "representation of the
main forms of civilisation and of principal legal systems of the world" a criterion in
elections to the Court. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 9, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1060, 3 Bevans 1179.
43.
ECOSOC Res. 1985/17, supra note 33, at 2.
44.
Convention Against Enforced Disappearance, supra note 1, art. 26(1);
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 39, art. 34(4). The
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adds to involve people with
disabilities.
45.
Convention Against Enforced Disappearance, supra note 1, art. 26(1);
Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, art. 17(1); ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 31(2).
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The Representation of Legal Expertise on the Committees

As a matter of fact, a large number of the members of almost all
the treaty bodies have a legal background. Traditionally, the body
most dominated by lawyers has been the HRC, and currently all
members of the HRC but one have a legal background. 46 Lawyers
have also dominated the CAT, where at present 7 out of 10 members
are lawyers. 4 7 In the CESCR there are typically fewer members with
a legal background--currently, 12 out of its 18 members fall into that
category. 48 Only about half of the members of the CEDAW are
lawyers, and, as a result of the first elections to the CERD, lawyers
were even in a minority--out of the 18 members, 10 were serving
diplomats, one was a retired diplomat, 4 were law professors, and 3
judges. 49 This low representation has since 50changed: currently 12 out
of the 18 members have a legal background.
The singling out of the legal profession and its strong
representation on the treaty bodies has met with different responses.
Scott suggests that the focus on the need for representation of the
legal profession was based on the assumption that law is the most
relevant discipline for the treaty bodies and criticizes this practice as
elevating one discipline above all others. 5 1 He adds that although the
Convention Against Torture refers only to the need to consider
including "some persons having legal experience," 52 this reference has
resulted in priority being given to lawyers in the nomination and
Byrnes, referring to CEDAW, welcomes the
election process. 53
professional diversity on the Committee as having been valuable in

See Human Rights Committee Members, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
46.
bodies/hrc/members.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (listing the curricula vitae of
individual members).
See Committee Against Torture-Membership, http://www2.ohchr.orgl
47.
englishfbodies/cat/members.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (listing the curricula vitae
of individual members).
See Election of the Members of the Committee on Economic, Social and
48.
Cultural Rights to Replace Those Whose Terms Are Due to Expire on 31 December
2008, http:/www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/cescr/elections.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2009) (listing the curricula vitae of individual members). No information was available
on the background of one member: Mr Yuri Kolovsov.
Michael Banton, Decision-Taking in the Committee on the Elimination of
49.
Racial Discrimination, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING,

supranote 2, at 55.
50.
See generally Committee on the Elimination of Racial DiscriminationMembers, http://www2.ohchr.org/englishfbodies/cerd/members.htm (last visited Feb.
23, 2009) (listing the curricula vitae of individual members).
Scott, supra note 35, at 418.
51.
Convention Against Torture, supranote 29, art. 17(1) (emphasis added).
52.
Scott, supra note 35, at 418.
53.
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the areas of economic and social rights and development. 54 Craven,
speaking about one of the early sessions of the CESCR, points out a
"need for wider knowledge particularly as regards the rights to food,
clothing and housing" and has criticized the (no longer relevant) fact
that the vast majority of the members of the CESCR at that time had
a legal background.5 5 In contrast with Craven's view on the CESCR,
the predominance of lawyers on the HRC has been criticized very
little. 56 The stark difference in legal representation among the
members of the HRC and the CESCR is noteworthy (17 out of 18
versus 11 out of 18), which may indicate a lingering perception that
economic, social, and cultural rights have less of a true legal
character than civil and political rights. Likewise, it seems that the
monitoring of civil and political rights is regarded as a distinctly legal
task, whereas this is less so the case for the supervision of states'
compliance with economic, social, and cultural rights. As the CESCR
serves the same legal functions as the HRC, such a distinction cannot
be supported rationally.
Given the unique and diverse functions of treaty bodies, their
interdisciplinary composition of lawyers, economists, and political
and social scientists is beneficial for the understanding of the human
rights treaties, since such treaties typically involve an assessment of
laws, policies, and administrative practices of states that requires
expertise broader than legal knowledge. The fact that some of the
treaties nonetheless specifically mention the inclusion of lawyers
indicates that the law and legal methods of interpretation have,
however, a particularly important role to play in the work of the
committees.
This is confirmed by the overwhelmingly strong
representation of lawyers on the treaty bodies as compared with other
professions, which enables those bodies very well to apply legal rules
of interpretation. The challenge is to maximize the benefits derived
from using different areas of expertise and to combine a distinctly
legal approach to the interpretation of rights and obligations with
other approaches when developing policy recommendations based on
the technical knowledge of committee members in specific areas.

54.
Committee
9 (1989).
55.
56.

Andrew Byrnes, The "Other" Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the
on the Eliminationof DiscriminationAgainst Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 1,
CRAVEN, supra note 20, at 46.
Scott, supra note 35, at 419-20.
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THE RELEVANCE OF LEGAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION FOR THE
WORK OF THE TREATY BODIES

A. An Obligation: Treaty Bodies Interpreting in lieu of States Parties
The interpretation rules of customary international law laid
down in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention apply to human
rights treaties as much as they apply to other international law
treaties.
Typically, states parties interpret a treaty themselves, since the
existence of monitoring mechanisms with interpretative powers is the
exception rather than the rule in international law.5 7 Relying on the
parties alone would, however, be problematic in the case of human
rights treaties. Because these instruments impose obligations on
states that have to be fulfilled vis-A-vis individuals as third-party
beneficiaries, states would have an obvious interest in interpreting
them restrictively in order to retain more liberty in domestic policy
making and ease the burden imposed upon them. In addition, the
lack of inter-state complaints shows that states are reluctant to
meddle in the human rights affairs of other parties or to accuse them
A system of interpretation and
of human rights violations. 58
compliance monitoring inter se is hence insufficient for human rights
treaties. Therefore, the human rights treaty bodies have been
created in order to ensure an independent supervisory process and to
build specialized knowledge among a group of independent experts.
The responsibility for determining how rights can be realized and
whether or not states have fulfilled their obligations rests primarily
with the treaty bodies rather than with the states parties.5 9 The
treaty bodies hence assume to a large extent, among other roles, the
interpretative role that is normally played by states. As they act
largely in lieu of states, they are bound to the same extent as states
by the rules of interpretation by which states would be bound.
Regular references to the Vienna Convention by the treaty bodies
indicate that they recognize the relevance of this instrument to their
60
work.

57.
See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the monitoring functions performed by
the treaty bodies).
Louis Henkin, The InternationalBill of Rights: The Universal Declaration
58.
and the Covenants, in INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 8 (Rudolf
Bernhardt & John Anthony Jolowicz eds., 1985).
59.
Alston & Quinn, supra note 20, at 163 (referring to the ICESCR). For the
ICESCR, Craven points out that states have also only rarely made direct statements
regarding the meaning of its provisions. CRAVEN, supra note 20, at 91.
60.
See U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6, 14,
CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1, 2005) (referencing art. 27 of the Vienna Convention); U.N.
14-15, 20
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5,
CRC/GC/2003/5 (Oct. 3, 2003) (referencing arts. 2, 19, 27 of the Vienna Convention);
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As the treaty bodies are the main interpreters of human rights
treaties, through their output they are also the principal generators
of "subsequent practice" in the sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention, which can be used in interpretation together with the
context of a treaty.6 1 Given the special role of the committees as
compared with other multilateral treaties, it would be inappropriate
62
to limit "practice" to subsequent state practice alone.

The role of states cannot, however, be completely ignored in the
process of interpreting a human rights treaty. It has been argued, for
instance, that states' responses to the treaty bodies' work, including

their General Comments,6 3 establish subsequent practice in the sense
of Article 31(3)(b).6 4 A significant degree of concurrence in state
practice has been taken as an indication of agreement by states

regarding a particular interpretation of a right. 65

Subsequent

practice has been understood as states' realizations of rights and
their participation in the supervisory mechanisms, 66 where they have
the opportunity to express their views on the interpretation of a
treaty by a committee. In practice, states rarely put forward their
own interpretations of specific rights. They typically base their
reports on the interpretations offered by the treaty bodies in General

Comments, the reporting guidelines, and the questions provided to

CESCR, General Comment No. 9, 3, E/C.12/1998/24 (Dec. 3, 1998) (referencing art. 27
of the Vienna Convention); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31,
3-4 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) (referencing arts. 26-27 of the Vienna
Convention); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 26,
1-2,
CCPRIC/21/Rev.I/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997) (referencing art. 41 of the Vienna
Convention); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24,
6, 16
CCPRIC/2 1/Rev. 1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994) (referencing arts. 19(3) and 20(4) of the Vienna
Convention). But see also supra U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24,
supra, 17 (rejecting the application of the Vienna Convention). The application of
legal rules of interpretation does not eliminate the possibility that different treaty
bodies might interpret similar rights differently, but it provides for a legitimate and
rational way of achieving an interpretation. See Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, The Emergence of
Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence,19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 101, 102
(1995) (documenting the divergence in interpretation in the areas of derogation from
enunciated rights in international treaties and the protection of non-derogable rights
by various human rights judicial bodies).
61.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31(3)(b).
62.
International Law Association (ILA), Committee on Human Rights Law
and Practice, Final Report on the Impact of Findings of the United Nations Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SEVENTYFIRST CONFERENCE 621, 628 (2004) [hereinafter ILA Final Report].
63.
The term "General Recommendations" instead of "General Comment" is
used by the CERD and the CEDAW. For ease of reference, the remainder of this Article
uses "General Comments" as shorthand for both.
64.
CRAVEN, supra note 20, at 91.
65.
Id. Craven views General Comments as being able to provoke agreements
in the sense of art. 31(3)(a).
66.
Id.
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them.67 They thereby indirectly endorse the views of the treaty
bodies. In such cases, the treaty bodies' interpretations and the fact
that they have been accepted and jointly acted upon by states
establish subsequent practice. During more than two hundred state
reporting procedures before the CESCR until 2005, only a handful of
states have pointed out that General Comments are not legally
binding68 and have thereby indicated indirect disapproval of the
CESCR's work. Some states, however, have indicated disapproval or
the
simply ignored the CESCR's work, which speaks against
69
establishment of subsequent practice in the areas discussed.
There are also rare cases where the views of a treaty body and of
states parties differ clearly. An example is the recent challenge to the
validity and substance of the HRC's views by the United States,
which expressed concern about the HRC's interpretation that the
ICCPR applies outside a country's territory. 70 Any direct or indirect
rejection of a treaty body's views requires a detailed analysis of how
convincingly each side has argued its case and how widely the
objecting state's views are endorsed by other states.
The interpretations of a treaty body may hence establish and
reflect the parties' agreement regarding the interpretation of rights
and obligations under a treaty71 and, where widely accepted, can
induce and reflect "subsequent practice" in the sense of Article
31(3)(b).
Two conclusions can be drawn. First, the treaty bodies are the
main interpreters of the human rights treaties. Because they thereby
fulfill the role that normally states fulfill, they are bound by the same
rules of interpretation as states-the Vienna Convention rules. The
application of the Vienna rules of interpretation is, hence, not merely

See ILA Final Report, supra note 62, at 631-57 (cataloguing the use of
67.
General Comments in national courts).
des
Bestimmungen
Bemerkungen zu
Allgemeine
68.
Eibe
Riedel,
Internationalen Paktes uber Wirtschaftliche, Soziale und Kulturelle Rechte der
Vereinten Nationen [The General Comments on the Clauses of the United Nations
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights], in DIE GENERAL
COMMENTS ZU DEN VN-MENSCHENRECHTSVERTRAGEN-DEUTSCHE UBERSETZUNG UND
KURZEINF]HRUNG [THE GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIESGERMAN TRANSLATION AND SHORT INTRODUCTION] 160, 165 (2005). Occasionally, the
work of the Human Rights Committee has elicited negative responses, in particular its
General Comment on Reservations. CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN
IDEALISM TO REALISM 157 (2003). For states' objections to the latter General Comment,
see U.N. Human Rights Committee, Report of the Human Rights Committee, Annex VI,
U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (Apr. 13, 1997) (France); U.N. Human Rights Committee, Report of
the Human Rights Committee, Annex VI, U.N. Doc. A/50/40/ (Oct. 3, 1995) (UK and

U.S.).
See infra Part IV.
69.
70.
U.S. Comments on the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee, Addendum, U.N. Doc. CCPRICIUSAICO/3[Rev.l/Add. 1 (Feb. 12, 2008).
THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 10
71.
(1986) (referring to CERD).
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an option but an obligation.
Second, the committees' findings,
together with states' endorsement of them, constitute subsequent
practice under Article 31(3)(b).
B. A Necessity: The Need to Ensure Impact by Using Legal
Rules of Interpretation
While the treaty bodies are obliged to adhere to legal rules of
interpretation, it is also in their own best interest to do so because the
de facto legal force and impact of their work depends on its
persuasiveness and analytical rigor. The next subpart will discuss to
what extent each of the treaty bodies' activities has a legal character,
and what role legal interpretation should play for each. It will
demonstrate that the application of legal means of interpretation is
necessary because of the legal dimension of the treaty bodies' output.
The treaty bodies carry out three main tasks to discharge their
functions: they (1) formulate concluding observations on state reports,
(2) develop General Comments, and (3) adopt views on individual
communications.7 2 The last activity is performed only by those treaty
bodies open to individuals-the CERD, the HRC, the CAT, and the
CEDAW. 73 In the future, the remaining treaty bodies might also be
able to hear individual petitions.
Some of the treaty bodies may also perform monitoring functions
through inquiry procedures 7 4 and the examination of inter-state
complaints. 75 In practice, both mechanisms have played a marginal
role, as they have been used rarely. Finally, since June 2006, a subcommittee of the Committee Against Torture-the Sub-Committee on
Prevention-can carry out in-country inspections of places of
detention.76
1.

Concluding Observations

The activity where the role of legal interpretation is, at first
glance, least apparent is the formulation of concluding observations-

72.
See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/treaty/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Human Rights Treaty Bodies].
73.
Id.
74.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, art. 20 (conducting inquiries on
Turkey, Egypt, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Mexico); Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, annex,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. AIRES/54/4 (1999) (conducting only
one inquiry: on Mexico).
75.
The procedure of inter-state complaints has never been used.
76.
See Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 57/199, annex, U.N.
GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/57/199 (2003).
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the mainstay of the treaty bodies' work. In their concluding
observations, the committees assist parties with realizing human
rights. 77 The treaty bodies review national implementation of the
treaty they monitor state by state, on the basis of reports that states
parties have to submit at regular intervals. States are required to
submit an initial report usually one year after joining a treaty and
then required by the provisions of the treaty to submit periodic
reports thereafter, generally every four or five years. 78 In addition to
the government report, the treaty bodies receive information from
other sources, including nongovernmental organizations, UN
agencies,
other
intergovernmental
organizations,
academic
institutions, and the press. 79 During their regular sessions, the
committees examine the state reports together with government
representatives in a "constructive dialogue."8 0 This characterization
provides an indication of the nature of the process: it is meant to be
one of dialogue, not of adjudication in the sense of court proceedings.
Primarily, the task of the treaty bodies is to convince and persuade
rather than to judge. Finally, the committees publish their concerns
and recommendations in "concluding observations," in which they set
out whether or not the state concerned was acting in conformity with
its treaty obligations and show the relevance of a treaty to a specific
situation.Si The Concluding Observations reflect a consensus on how
the provisions of a treaty should be interpreted with regard to the
particular situation in a country.
Generally, they include an
introductory section and parts on positive aspects, concerns and
recommendations. 8 2 Unfortunately, given the relatively short time
that the treaty bodies can dedicate to each country, the concluding
observations remain often at a rather general level, and their
83
jurisprudential impact is marginal and exceptional.

77.
Formally, the CESCR only "assists" ECOSOC in the consideration of state
reports. ECOSOC Res. 1985/17, supra note 33, at 2. In practice, the work of the
Committee has, however, drawn little interest from the latter, and only in a few cases
the CESCR has sought the approval of ECOSOC for the adoption of its working
methods, e.g., when adopting its Rules of Procedure or when determining the ability of
NGOs to submit information. CRAVEN, supra note 20, at 50. In practice, ECOSOC does
little more than to note the CESCR's annual report, and states have accepted this
practice.
78.
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, supra note 72.
79.
Id.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.

82.
The way the treaty bodies structure their concluding observations differs
slightly from one treaty body to another. The concluding observations of the CESCR,
for instance, contain an introduction and sections on positive aspects, on factors and
difficulties impeding the implementation of the ICESCR, on principal subjects of
concerns, and suggestions and recommendations.
83.
ILA Final Report, supra note 62, at 684; Philip Alston, The Historical
Origins of "General Comments" in Human Rights Law, in L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE
INTERNATIONAL, UN SYSTEM EN QUETE D'EQUITt ET D'UNIVERSALITE-LIBER
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When focusing only on the strong emphasis on constructive
dialogue, it could be assumed that legal rules of interpretation played
a lesser role in the formulation of concluding observations than with
regard to the other two activities of the treaty bodies-individual
communications and General Comments. However, a closer look at
the differences between formal legal processes before a court and the
comparatively informal procedures before the treaty bodies reveals
that concluding observations can operate to similar effect as
judgments. Despite the facts that treaty body members are not
judges, that their concluding observations are not binding, and that
the committees rely to a great extent on the goodwill and cooperation
of the states in front of them, it seems that governments and
especially NGOs perceive these concluding observations as something
akin to judgments, rendering the difference between formal
adjudication and concluding observations less significant in practice.
Nonetheless, whereas courts can rely on the fact that their judgments
are legally binding in a formal sense, the degree of de facto legal force
that accrues to the output of treaty bodies depends on the extent to
which the concluding observations are convincing and persuasive.
This, in turn, depends on the degree to which the application of an
appropriate and accepted method of interpretation is discernible
which makes the interpretations rational and legitimate as far as
legal issues are concerned. Where policy advice is provided or policy
options are mentioned, other methods come into play.
2.

Individual Communications

The second activity of the treaty bodies-the hearing of
individual communications-has a clearer legal character than the
adoption of concluding observations because the committees have to
determine whether an individual's rights were violated or not in a
specific case.
Individuals who claim that a state party has violated their rights
may, under certain circumstances, bring a complaint or
communication before four of the human rights treaty bodies.8 4 One

AMICORUM GEORGES ABI-SAAB 763, 769 (Laurence de Boisson de Chazournes & Vera
Gowlland-Debbas eds., 2001).
84.
The HRC may consider individual communications relating to States
Parties to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. First Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). The CEDAW may consider individual
communications relating to states parties to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
supra note 74. The CAT may consider individual communications relating to states
parties who have made the necessary declaration under Art. 22 of the Convention
Against Torture, and the CERD may consider individual communications relating to
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criterion of admissibility for this process, among others, is that local
remedies have been exhausted. 85 The human rights treaties thereby
assume that the issues raised in a communication were or could have
been raised and dealt with in state judicial or administrative
proceedings. 8 6 The procedure before the treaty bodies is, however,
not a continuation of the national proceedings in any way.8 7 Rather,
the treaty bodies undertake an independent review of the activities in
question, based on the respective treaty.8 8 They state their findings
89
and may also propose an appropriate remedy for a violation.

If a

treaty body finds a violation, it thereby indicates that, in its opinion,
90
the state party is under a legal obligation to remedy the situation.
The independent review of the treaty bodies differs significantly from
the work of a court. Whereas the judges of a court typically have
legal training, the members of the treaty bodies have diverse
There are no oral proceedings and individual
backgrounds.9 1
92
communications are considered in closed session.
Through the individual communications procedure, the treaty
bodies are inevitably involved in the development of the human rights
treaties by "confronting [a treaty's] ambiguities and indeterminacy,

states parties who have made the necessary declaration under Art. 14 of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, art. 22; International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 36, art. 14. The
Convention on Migrant Workers also contains a provision for allowing individual
communications to be considered by the CMW. CMW, supra note 39, art. 77(1). These
provisions will become operative when ten states parties have made the necessary
CMW, supra note 39, art. 77. The CRPD has the
declaration under Art. 77.
competence to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or
groups of individuals relating to states that have ratified the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. See Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N.
GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at
http:/www2.ohchr.org/english/law/disabilities-op.htm. The CED will be able to receive
and consider communications relating to states parties of the International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, subject to a declaration
by the relevant state party under Art. 31. Convention Against Enforced Disappearance,
supra note 1, art. 31. Finally, there will be an individual communications procedure
under the ICESCR once the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR enter into force. See
ICESCR, supra note 17; supra note 7.
Steiner, supra note 25, at 27 (referring to the HRC).
85.
Id. (referring to the HRC).
86.
87.
Id. at 28 (referring to the HRC).
88.
Id. (referring to the HRC).
89.
Id. at 28-29 (referring to the HRC).
90.
Cf. Martin Scheinin, International Mechanisms and Procedures for
Implementation, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 429, 444 (Raija Hanski & Markku Suksi eds., 1997).
See supra Part II.B. 1-.2.
91.
92.
Steiner, supra note 25, at 29 (referring to the HRC).
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resolving conflicts among its principles and rights, [and] working out
'93
meanings of its grand terms.
Despite their differences from court proceedings, the
communications procedures have been called "a distinctive form of
adjudication": "a collegial body of independent experts decides a claim
of violation ...in favor of one or the other party, by applying norms
that it interprets to facts . . . . It reaches a conclusion accompanied by
a suggestion of appropriate remedies for any violation that it
transmits to the parties. '94
According to Steiner, individual
communications procedures can serve three functions associated with
adjudicative bodies: (1) to do justice in the individual case within its
jurisdiction and to that extent vindicate the rule of law; (2) to protect
rights under the respective treaty through deterrence and related
behavior modification; and (3) to expound, elucidate, interpret or
explain the respective treaty so as to engage the treaty bodies in an
ongoing, fruitful dialogue with states parties, nongovernmental and
95
intergovernmental institutions, advocates, scholars, and students.
In particular, the HRC has developed an important body of
jurisprudence on civil and political rights that has helped to clarify
state obligations, led to remedies at the domestic level and regularly
inspired the regional human rights bodies and national courts. 96 The
HRC has been heavily criticized, however, when it did not adhere to
accepted principles of international law. Notably, the HRC's decision
to declare incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR a
reservation by Trinidad and Tobago to the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR that would have precluded the HRC from considering
individual communications involving death row prisoners-therefore
rejecting that preclusion-met with strong criticism, including by
four dissenting HRC members whose arguments relied on the text,
97
context, and object and purpose of the ICCPR.
3.

General Comments

The third major activity of the treaty bodies is the development
of General Comments. General Comments are, in Philip Alston's
words, "means by which a UN human rights expert committee distils
its considered views on an issue which arises out of the provisions of

93.
Id. at 39 (referring to the HRC).
94.
Id. at 30 (referring to the HRC).
95.
Id. at 31 (referring to the HRC). Interestingly, according to Steiner, the
views of the HRC have not made a significant contribution to the normative
development of the human rights movement. Id. at 39.
96.
It remains to be seen whether the strong representation of non-lawyers
becomes an issue for the CESCR as soon as it starts hearing cases under the Optional
Protocol. See supra note 7.
97.
Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, U.N. Human Rights Comm., No.
845/1999, app.
6-12, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/671D/845/1999 Annex (Dec. 31, 1999).
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the treaty whose implementation it supervises and presents those
views in the context of a formal statement of its understanding to
which it attaches major importance." 98 As discussed below, many
commentators attach particular normative significance to General
Comments-a fact that strongly calls for the use of legal means of
interpretation.
General Comments interpret specific rights or deal with crosscutting issues. They provide detailed content in a comprehensive and
coherent way to the rather generally worded provisions of a human
rights treaty, which is not possible when a treaty body comments on
an individual state's report. 9 9 Indeed, General Comments lend
interpretive assistance to the decision of individual complaints.
General Comments can advance thought about a difficult matter,
encourage debate about a treaty, and spread and deepen its relevance
to the human rights movement. 100 They assist states in better
reporting on the situation in their respective countries, facilitate
NGOs' efforts to provide the committees with useful shadow reports,
and improve the committees' opportunities for using the reporting
procedure effectively. In addition, they are useful for Specialized
Agencies and other bodies that deal with the implementation of a
specific right. They can also exert considerable persuasive force on

98.
Alston, supra note 83, at 764.
99.
A disadvantage of General Comments is that they are not contextual but
abstract developments of the content of a right. It should also be noted that this
description does not apply to the same extent to the General Comments of all treaty
bodies. The General Comments of the CERD, for instance, are rather short statements
than elaborate analyses of specific topics. Whereas the General Comments of the HRC
and the CRC are also rather long and detailed, the General Recommendations of CERD
and CEDAW are typically rather short statements. The CAT has adopted only two
General Comments, and the CMW has not yet issued any. All General Comments of
the treaty bodies except very recent ones are reproduced in International Human
Rights Instruments, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 1) and U.N.
Doc. HRIIGEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 2) (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter Compilation of General
Comments]. General Comments that are cited but not further referenced in this article
can be found there.
100.
Steiner, supra note 25, at 52.
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decision makers in domestic legal systems and national courts. 10 1 As
10 2
of May 2008, 119 General Comments had been issued.
In contrast with the development of the meaning of a right by a
court, the drafting of a General Comment is a participatory process
that usually involves three stages, although there is some variance
from committee to committee. First, a treaty body consults widely
with Specialized Agencies, NGOs, academics, and other human rights
treaty bodies, sometimes in the context of a day of general discussion
or a thematic debate.10 3 Next, a designated member of the committee
compiles a draft on the basis of the consultation process, which is
intended for further discussion by the committee and interested
parties.' 0 4 Finally, the revised draft of the General Comment is
formally adopted in plenary session. 10 5 The committees act as
"clearing centres" for the divergent interpretations that are proposed
and draw on the insights they have gained from the review and
assessment of state reports. 0 6 General Comments are adopted
unanimously and represent the collective opinion of the respective
07
treaty body.1
The adoption of a General Comment is a cumbersome, contested,
and competitive process and obviously some committee members,
academics, and NGOs exert greater influence than others and shape
the quality and content of the outcome. The particular nature of the
drafting procedure helps to explain why different General Comments
from the same committee can vary in their treatment of an issue, as
the example of the CESCR's conceptualization of core obligations
discussed in Part IV will show.
Given that the drafting of a General Comment is a process in
which a large number of actors pursue their interests and advance

101.
For a detailed overview of the extent and nature of the reception of General
Comments by national courts, see ILA Final Report, supra note 62, at 631-57;
International Law Association, Interim Report on the Impact of the Work of the United
Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies on National Courts and Tribunals, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE SEVENTIETH CONFERENCE 507, 516-

26 (2002) [hereinafter ILA Interim Report]. While their use by courts, tribunals, and
similar adjudicative or quasi-judicial institutions such as ombudspersons is well
documented, the impact of their work on domestic legislatures is not yet well
researched. See, nonetheless, the illustrative overview of the use of treaty body work by
legislatures, human rights commissions, law reform committees, and other national
actors in ILA FinalReport, supra note 62, at 675-83.
102.
Compilation of General Comments, supra note 99.
103.
International Human Rights Instruments, Note by the Secretariat,Report
on the Working Methods of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Relating to the State Party
Reporting Process, 107, UN Doc. HRJIMC/2005/4 (May 25, 2005).
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
Cf. CRAVEN, supra note 20, at 4.
107.
Cf. DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE-ITs ROLE IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

347 (1991) (recognizing the General Comment as a collective opinion of the body).

20091

TREATY BODIES AND THE INTERPRETA TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

929

their views, the treaty bodies must be guided by a clear method when
making their interpretative decisions. Otherwise, they will face
difficulties in explaining and justifying their decisions and in carrying
out their task as "clearing centres" in a principled and legally
convincing way. Only on the basis of clear criteria can it be explained
why one proposed interpretation is to be favored over another.
Legal method is also necessary in view of the normative
significance of General Comments for the development of human
rights law. Views on the legal relevance of General Comments differ
widely. Some commentators attach no legal value to them1 08 or
regard them only as valuable indications of the content of rights and
the steps that states parties could or should undertake to ensure
implementation, 0 9 as useful signposts, 110 or as important aids for
interpretation.i"'
According to others, General Comments have
"practical authority" because they represent an important body of
experience in considering matters from the angle of the respective
treaty. 112
Many commentators, however, accept that General
Comments have considerable legal weight. 113 They suggest that a
committee is the most authoritative interpreter of the treaty it
monitors 1 4 and that states parties are not free to disregard a treaty
body's interpretation with which they disagree, despite its nonbinding
nature. 115 They view a treaty body's output as more than mere

108.
See Kavanagh v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison, [2001] I.E.H.C. 77, § 12
(June 29, 2001) (Ir.) ("The views [of the HCR have] the moral authority but nothing
more than that."). The High Court of Ireland referred to the views of the HRC, but it is
unlikely that it would pass a different judgment on General Comments. See also
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v. Magno, (1992) 112 A.L.R 529, 573 (Austl.)
("[T]he HR Committee's report is not binding on an acceding state party."). In various
instances, Japanese courts have stated that General Comments are at most taken into
account as opinions on the level of facts and do not bind the interpretation of the
ICCPR and the ICESCR by Japanese Courts. See ILA Interim Report, supra note 101,
at 519 n.34 (observing the tendencies of Japnese courts).
109.
Cf. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 107, at 94 (citing the role the General
Comment plays in advising States of the necessary steps to comply with treaty
obligations).
110.
Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An
Argument for De-Marginalizing Enforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV 211, 231
(1998).
111.
Riedel, supra note 68, at 164.
112.
Torkel Opsahl, The General Comments of the Human Rights Committee, in
DES MENSCHEN RECHT ZWISCHEN FREIHEIT UND VERANTWORTUNG-FESTSCHRIFT FUR
KARL JOSEF PARTSCH ZUM 75 GEBURTSTAG 273-75, 283-84 (Jirgen Jekewitz ed., 1989);
see also Riedel, supra note 68, at 164 (emphasizing that General Comments reflect
typical problems with the implementation of a right as apparent from the practice of
the CESCR).
113.
CRAVEN, supra note 20, at 91; see also ILA Interim Report, supra note 101,
at 517-18 (citing numerous references to national cases).
114.
Cf. Scheinin, supra note 90, at 444.
115.
ILA Interim Report, supranote 102, at 517-18.
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recommendations. 116
Some even regard General Comments as
"authoritative interpretations" 117 of the rights of a treaty.1 1 8 General
Comments also contribute to the formation of customary
international law by helping to shape opinio iuris and state practice.
Given their normative authority and role, the treaty bodies bear a
specific responsibility to apply a sound legal methodology when legal
questions are concerned, since otherwise no useful interpretations
can be achieved.

IV.

NEGLECT OF THE VIENNA RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES: THREE EXAMPLES FROM THE
WORK OF THE CESCR

Having set out an abstract argument in favor of a stronger and
more coherent application of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention, this Part will illustrate its relevance by discussing three
examples form the work of the CESCR.
Following a brief

116.
See Scheinin, supra note 90, at 444.
117.
Commission on Human Rights, The Right to Food: Report on the Third
Expert Consultation on the Right to Food, 14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/148 (Mar. 30,
2001); Commission on Human Rights, The Right to Food: Report of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights,
58, U.N. Doc. E/CN.412000/48 (Jan. 13, 2000);
Andrew Byrnes, Women, Feminism and International Human Rights LawMethodological Myopia, Fundamental Flaws or Meaningful Marginalisation?, 12
AUSTL. Y.B. INT.'L. L. 205, 216 (1992); Caroline Dommen, Claiming Environmental
Rights: Some PossibilitiesOffered by the United Nations' Human Rights Mechanisms,
11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REV. 1, 21 (1998); Karl Herndl, Zur Frage des rechtlichen
Status der Entscheidungen eines Staatengemeinschaftsorgans: die "views" des
Menschenrechtsausschusses[On the Question of the Legal Status of the Decision of an
Organ of the Community of States: The Human Rights Committee's Views], in
VOLKERRECHT ZWISCHEN NORMATIVEM ANSPRUCH UND POLITISCHER REALITAT:
FESTSCHRIFT FOR KARL ZEMANEK ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG [PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
BETWEEN NORMATIVE DEMAND AND POLITICAL REALITY: FESTSCHRIFT FOR KARL
ZEMANEK'S 65TH BIRTHDAY] 203, 209, 212 (K. Ginther ed., 1994) (referring to the views
of the HRC); David Weissbrodt & Kell Schoff, Human Rights Approach to Intellectual
Property Protection: The Genesis and Application of Sub-Commission Resolution
2000/7, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 4 (2003). Contra U.S. Comments on the
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 70, at 9
(arguing that article 40 of the ICCPR does not give the HRC authority to issue legally
binding or authoritative interpretations of the Covenant); Christian Tomuschat,
National Implementation of International Standards on Human Rights, CAN. HUM.
RTS. Y.B. 31, 36 (1984) (referring to the HRC).
118.
See Carlos Villdn Durdn, The Rights to Food and Drinking Water in
InternationalLaw: New Developments, in 4 0s RUMOS DO DIREITO INTERNACIONAL Dos
DIREITOS HUMANOS-RUMBOS DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS-TRENDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 453 (Renato
Zerbini Ribeiro Ledo ed., 2005) (describing the ICESCR). Such increased legal
relevance can only be assumed where the treaty bodies interpret rights and obligations
under a treaty. It does not accrue to policy recommendations which are much more
dependent on context and might change over time.
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introduction to the specific characteristics of the General Comments
of the CESCR, the examples of (1) the obligations of international
organizations; (2) extraterritorial obligations; and (3) core obligations
will demonstrate how the text, context, and object and purpose,
respectively, have been neglected and how such neglect has led to
unconvincing results that have harmed the credibility, legitimacy,
and usefulness of the work of the CESCR with respect to illuminating
the meaning of the legal obligations created by the ICESCR.
The following critique of the General Comments of the CESCR
does not deny that the General Comments of the committee have
contributed significantly to the understanding of social, economic,
and cultural rights. The CESCR has taken a constructivist approach
and developed a common understanding of the rights guaranteed by
the ICESCR. Since General Comment No. 12 on the Right to Food, 119
the CESCR has consistently used two analytical frameworks for the
interpretation of the ICESCR's rights.
The first distinguishes
availability, accessibility, and adequacy or quality. 120 The second
refers to states parties' duties and breaks them down into obligations
to respect, protect, and fulfill and, with regard to the last obligation,
the sub-duties to facilitate, promote, and provide. 12 1 Each General
Comment on a right or cross-cutting issue sets out in some detail
basic premises, normative content, states' obligations, violations and
implementation at the national level, and international obligations.
Despite having achieved some consistency in the overall approach
and presentation, considerable inconsistencies and discrepancies
remain in the interpretation of obligations from one General
Comment to another, and some of the obligations suggested by the
CESCR cannot be based on a principled interpretation of the ICESCR
guided by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.

A. The Text of the ICESCR and the "Obligations"of
InternationalOrganizations
The first example that shows the negative consequences of not
adhering to legal rules of interpretation is the CESCR's treatment of
the obligations of international organizations under the ICESCR.
This example demonstrates the importance of paying close attention
to the text of a human rights treaty, which is one of the three
requirements under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.
The Article rejects the assumption of obligations of international

119.
CESCR, General Comment No. 12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999).
120.
Depending on the right protected, additional elements come into play, for
instance acceptability in the case of the right to food.
121.
The obligation to "promote" was introduced as a sub-category of the
obligation to fulfil in General Comment No. 15. CESCR, General Comment No. 15,
25, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003).

932

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:905

organizations under the ICESCR on the basis that there is no
indication the text of the ICESCR which only addresses the
obligations of states. 122
It suggests that the CESCR's contrary
position has weakened each of the General Comments in which it has
addressed the issue.
As with other human rights treaties, only states can become
123
parties to the ICESCR and be bound by its provisions.
Throughout, the ICESCR addresses states parties.1 24 International
organizations are only mentioned in Part IV of the treaty, which
contains provisions on the reporting procedure and the interplay of
various UN bodies in this process. 125 The roles of international cooperation and of international organizations in achieving the
implementation of the ICESCR are mentioned. 126 The relationship
between the CESCR and international organizations is addressed in
Article 22 of the ICESCR, according to which ECOSOC
may bring to the attention of other organs of the United Nations, their
subsidiary organs and Specialized Agencies concerned with furnishing
technical assistance any matters arising out of the reports referred to in
this part of the present Covenant which may assist such bodies in
deciding, each within its field of competence, on the advisability of
international measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive
127
implementation of the present Covenant.

The role of ECOSOC has since been taken up by the CESCR. In
Article 22, the ICESCR recognizes that international organizations
and bodies may play an important role in contributing to the
realization of economic, social, and cultural rights, and gives
ECOSOC (the CESCR) the power to make recommendations on how
to do so. 1 2 s It contains, however, no obligation to this effect.
Very early on in its work, the CESCR has elaborated upon the
role of international organizations. In General Comment No. 2 on
International
Technical
Assistance
Measures,
the
CESCR
recommended a number of ways that international organizations or
bodies can contribute to the realization of economic, social, and
cultural rights. 129 It also mentioned detrimental measures that

122.
The Author does not generally reject the concept of human rights
obligations of international organizations. The argument is limited to the question
whether such exist under the ICESCR.
123.
ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 26.
124.
See, e.g., id. pmbl., arts. 1(3), 2(2), 3(1), 4(1).
125.
See id. pt. IV.
126.
See id.
127.
Id. art. 22.
128.
Id.
129.
CESCR, General Comment No. 2, U.N. Doc. E11990123, annex III, at 86
(1990).
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should be avoided. 130 Following some recommendations in General
Comment No. 7 on Forced Evictions, 131 General Comment No. 8 on
Sanctions introduces (albeit only in passing) the concept of human
rights obligations of international organizations. 132 The turning
point can be found in General Comment No. 12 on the Right to Food,
where the CESCR for the first time speaks specifically and in detail
133
It
of international obligations of international organizations.
discusses the role of the UN, the WFP, the UNHCHR, UNICEF, the
FAO, the World Bank, and the IMF, among others, in realizing the
right to food, under the heading "international obligations".1 34 In
General Comment No. 13 on the Right to Education, the pendulum
swings back to mere recommendations, which are based explicitly on
Article 22 of the ICESCR. 135 In General Comments No. 14 on the
Right to Health and No. 15 on the Right to Water, the CESCR
returns to the heading "obligations of actors other than States
parties." 136 Although General Comment No. 16 on the Equal Rights
of Men and Women does not address the issue, 137 General Comments
No. 17 on Authors' Rights and No. 18 on the Right to Work do contain
a section with this heading-but they mention specifically that only
states parties are held accountable for compliance with the
The Comments shed no further light on this
ICESCR. 138
contradiction.
In both General Comments, the CESCR further
provides some recommendations for international organizations, 1 39 as
140
does General Comment No. 19 on the Right to Social Security.
Three characteristics of the CESCR's work on the obligations of
international organizations are troubling. The first is that the

130.
As the CESCR has assumed the functions of ECOSOC in the reporting
procedure, the CESCR plays the role set out in this paragraph of providing
recommendations to international organisations and bodies.
General Comments Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 do not address international
131.
organisations. General Comment No. 7 on Forced Evictions contains two paragraphs
with recommendations. CESCR, General Comment No. 7, 1 17-18, U.N. Doc.
E/1998/22, annex IV (May 20, 1997).
CESCR, General Comment No. 8, 9 11, U.N. Doc. EIC.12/199718 (Dec. 12,
132.
1997).
General Comment No. 12, supra note 119, 38.
133.
134.
Id. TT 38-41. It is noteworthy that the formulations used by the CESCR
resemble recommendations more than obligations.
135.
CESCR, General Comment No. 13, 60, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8,
1999).
CESCR, General Comment No. 14, 9 63-64, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug.
136.
11, 2000); General Comment No. 15, supra note 121, 60.
CESCR, General Comment No. 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005).
137.
CESCR, General Comment No. 17, 55, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12,
138.
2006); CESCR, General Comment No. 18, 52, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006).
57; General Comment No. 18,
139.
General Comment No. 17, supra note 138,
supra note 138, at 9 53.
82-84, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Feb.
140.
CESCR, General Comment No. 19,
4, 2008).

934

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:905

CESCR does not set out from where it derives the obligations of nonstate actors. According to its text, but also its context and object and
purpose, the ICESCR clearly binds only states parties. 141 Even if all
members of an international organization were party to it, the
organization itself, being a separate legal entity, would not be bound.
The CESCR also neither implicitly nor explicitly engages with any of
the theories that have been developed in favor of human rights
obligations of international organizations. 142 Second, the CESCR
exceeds its mandate by dealing with obligations of international
organizations. As only states have obligations under the ICESCR,
the CESCR's mandate is limited to an interpretation of states'
obligations. Yet, the CESCR explicitly addresses obligations of nonstate actors, including international organizations. 1 43 Third, the
CESCR addresses the topic in an incoherent manner: whereas the
headings speak of international obligations, the text beneath is
always formulated in more flexible terms, using "should" throughout,

141.
See supranote 124 and accompanying text.
142.
The U.N. itself has human rights obligations because the protection of
human rights is one of its purposes, U.N. Charter art. 1(3). Sohn proposes that the
ICCPR and the ICESCR
[t]hough [they] resemble traditional international agreements which bind only
those who ratify them . . . partake of the creative force of the [Universal]
Declaration [of Human Rights] and constitute in a similar fashion an
authoritative interpretation of the basic rules of international law on the
subject of human rights which are embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations.
Louis Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 129, 135 (1977).
De Wet suggests that as the ICCPR and the ICESCR were negotiated under the
auspices of the UN and as the organization created an extensive system for monitoring
states' obligations under these treaties, it created the expectation that it would respect
human rights itself. Erika de Wet, Human Rights Limitations to Economic
Enforcement Measures Under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter and the Iraqi
Sanctions Regime, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 277, 284 (2001). Some regard the UN
Specialised Agencies (in the sense of UN Charter art. 57) as having human rights
obligations by virtue of their relationship with the UN. Through relationship
agreements (as provided for in the U.N. Charter art. 63(1)) they became part of the UN
system and undertook to respect the principles and purposes contained in the UN
Charter, including human rights. Philip Alston, The InternationalMonetary Fund and
the Right to Food, 30 HOW. L.J. 473, 479 (1987). In addition and most importantly, all
international organizations are bound by customary international law, including
customary human rights law. See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951
Between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 95 (Dec. 20) (referring
to obligations under "general international law"); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NILS
BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY 1002, § 1579
(2003); BOWETT'S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 458, 14-037 (Philippe Sands &
Pierre Klein eds., 2001); August Reinisch, The Changing International Legal
Framework for Dealing with Non-State Actors, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 37, 46 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
None of these authors argues, however, that international organizations have
direct legal obligations under human rights treaties to which they are not party.
143.
See infra Part LV.B.
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as well as "responsibility," and avoiding the words "obligation" and
"duty."144 This incoherence indicates that the CESCR is aware of the
difficulties associated with its treatment of the subject matter but has
not been willing or able to find a less ambiguous way of expressing
itself. In the end, it remains unclear whether, according to the
CESCR, international organizations have human rights obligations
under the ICESCR, or some other source, or none at all. It seems
that the CESCR intends to associate itself with the growing number
of voices that support human rights obligations of international
organizations and private actors. Although this is a laudable goal, it
is problematic that by using the concept of "obligationsof actors other
than states" the CESCR disregards the text of the ICESCR, goes
beyond its mandate, and favors its promotional role at the expense of
its interpretative function.
Because the CESCR's approach cannot be based on the text of
the ICESCR, it does not result from an application of the methods
laid down in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, which
forbids interpretation contrary to the text. Disconnected from any
methodological basis, its conclusions seem to have been reached at
random. Because statements rather than arguments are offered, it is
also difficult to reconstruct the train of thought of the CESCR. This
methodological shortcoming could have been avoided by eschewing
the expression "obligations of actors other than states," and by
instead addressing the important role of non-state actors in more
flexible and policy-oriented terms, in line with Article 22 of the
ICESCR.
The CESCR pays a price for its endorsement of forward-looking
human rights thinking. Because this endorsement cannot be based
on a legally sound interpretation of the ICESCR, it undermines the
credibility and legitimacy of its overall interpretation output.
Embracing the concept of obligations of non-state actors is a shortsighted gain, given the serious longer-term decrease of the persuasive
force of its work.
B. The Context of the ICESCR and States'Extraterritorial
Obligations
The second example of the importance of method concerns the
concept of extraterritorial obligations, where the CESCR has not paid
sufficient attention to the methodological requirement of taking into
account the overall context of human rights law. The CESCR has
introduced a vague concept of extraterritorial obligations without
spelling out any meaningful detail and, more importantly in this
context, without basing its views on the context of the ICESCR. The

144.

See, e.g., General Comment No. 19, supra note 140,

82-83.
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result has been an approach that seems to be driven by good
intentions rather than by rational application of the ICESCR, and
which is detrimental to the legitimacy and legality of its
interpretations.
The CESCR developed the concept of extraterritorial obligations
based on various articles of the ICESCR that refer to international cooperation 14 5 or international action. 146 These include Article 2(1) of
the ICESCR, according to which "[e]ach State Party... undertakes to
take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the ... Covenant[.]"' 1 47 The
CESCR interprets this and other references as implying
extraterritorial obligations, i.e., obligations of states vis-A-vis
individuals in other states directly and indirectly through a state's
activities in international organizations. This Part focuses on the
CESCR's views concerning direct extraterritorial obligations, as in
this field the scope of states parties' obligations under the ICESCR
has remained particularly unclear and unsystematic, and little
guided by a methodologically grounded approach.
Since its early General Comments, the CESCR has interpreted
references to international co-operation as implying obligations to
provide development assistance. 148
General Comment No. 8 on
Sanctions expanded this understanding and developed an obligation
of every state involved in a sanctions regime "to protect at least the
core content of the economic, social and cultural rights" of people in a
state affected by sanctions. 149 In an attempt to cover all states,
including nonparties to the ICESCR, the General Comment mentions,
in a convoluted paragraph, the UN Charter, Article 2(1) of the
ICESCR, and general international law as the legal bases of this

145.
ICESCR, supra note 17, arts. 2(1), 11(1), 11(2), 15(1V).
146.
Id. art. 23.
147.
Id. art. 2.
148.
CESCR, General Comment No. 4,
19, U.N. Doc. E/1992123, annex III at
114 (1991); CESCR, General Comment No. 3, 14, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86
(1990). The CESCR regularly calls upon states to increase their levels of official
development assistance. E.g. CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-Finland,

12, 21 UN Doc. EIC.12/COIFINI5

(Jan. 16, 2008); CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights-Ireland, 37, UN Doc. E/C.12/1l/Add.77 (June 5, 2002);
CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights-Germany, 33, UN Doc. E/C.12/1l/Add.68 (Sept. 24, 2001); CESCR, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights--Japan, 37,
UN Doc. EIC.12/lAdd.67 (Sept. 24, 2001); CESCR, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-Finland,
13, 23, UN Doc.
E/C.12IlIAdd.52 (Dec. 1, 2000).
149.
General Comment No. 8, supranote 132,
7-8, 12-14.
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obligation. 150 More specifically, the CESCR regards states parties as
obliged to take economic, social, and cultural rights fully into account
when designing a sanctions regime as well as to monitor its effects
and to respond to any disproportionate suffering experienced by
vulnerable groups within the targeted country. 151 A concept of
general extraterritorial obligations was introduced in General
Comment No. 12 on the Right to Food where the CESCR developed
very far-reaching obligations. 152
It applied its three types of
obligations-the obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill-to conduct
with an extraterritorial locus or with adverse effects beyond a state's
153
borders without requiring a territorial, jurisdictional, or other link.
It proposed that states "should take steps to respect the enjoyment of
the right to food in other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate
154
access to food and to provide the necessary aid when required."'
The only example of a concrete application of these obligations
provided is the obligation to refrain from food embargoes and not to
155
use food as an instrument of political and economic pressure.
Subsequently, the treatment of extraterritorial obligations has not
been homogenous.
General Comment No. 13 on the Right to
Education refers only generally to international assistance and cooperation. 156 In words similar to the ones cited from General
Comment No. 12, General Comment No. 14 on the Right to Health
requires states parties to "respect the enjoyment of the right to health
in other countries, . . . to prevent third parties from violating the
right in other countries, if they are able to influence these parties by
way of legal or political means," and to "facilitate access to essential
health facilities, goods, and services in other countries, wherever
possible and provide the necessary aid when required.' 15 7 General
Comment No. 15 applies the same scheme to the right to water but
makes the obligation to facilitate dependent on the availability of
resources, which is repetitive, given that all obligations under the
ICESCR that are not resources-neutral are subject to that limitation,
Extraterritorial
according to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. 158
obligations are not discussed in General Comment No. 16 on Equal
Rights Between Men and Women. 159 General Comment No. 17 on

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
17, art. 2;
limitation
159.

Id. 1 8.
Id.
12-14.
General Comment No. 12, supra note 119, 36.
Id.
Id.
Id. 37.
General Comment No. 13, supra note 135, 56.
General Comment No. 14, supra note 136, 39.
31-34; ICESCR, supra note
General Comment No. 15, supra note 121,
see also General Comment No. 19, supra note 140, 55 (describing a similar
in reference to the right to social security).
General Comment No. 16, supra note 137.
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Authors' Rights refers only in rather general terms to the importance
of international co-operation and does not mention extraterritorial
obligations. 160 In addition to this general cooperation obligation,
General Comment No. 18 on the Right to Work contains a direct
extraterritorial obligation "to promote the right to work in other
countries. 1 61
In contrast, the most recent General Comment,
General Comment No. 19 on Social Security, applies the three types
of obligations again but seems to merge the obligations to facilitate
162
and to provide.
The picture of extraterritorial obligations that appears from the
CESCR's General Comments remains patchy and unclear. With
every new General Comment the scope of such obligations seems
either to expand or to shrink again. No arguments are offered for
these changes. In addition, the mentioned paragraphs raise more
questions then they provide answers. Among them are: When is it
"required" to provide aid? To what extent do states have to assess ex
ante the potential implications of their policy measures for other
countries in order to respect rights abroad? How does the obligation
of the home state to regulate third parties like private corporations
relate to the obligations of the state of activity? Does the home state
bear responsibility if the foreign state is complicit in the violations of
a private actor? If there are differences in degree of realization of
certain rights between the home state and the state of activity, with
which standards should the private actor be made to comply?
It becomes clear that the purpose of General Comments has been
turned right around: instead of clarifying the meaning of state
obligations, the passages on direct extraterritorial obligations create
confusion and uncertainty. Largely, this is a function of the CESCR's
liberal approach to interpretation, which does not rely strongly
enough on clearly explaining its views' basis in the text, context, and
object and purpose of the ICESCR.
Given the far-reaching scope of the extraterritorial obligations
that the CESCR suggests in some of its General Comments, it is
striking that the CESCR has based its proposals on neither a detailed
analysis of the text of the provisions of the ICESCR and the different
ways in which they could be interpreted, 163 nor on the context or
object and purpose of the ICESCR. In contrast with many other
human rights treaties, the ICESCR contains no clause limiting its

160.
General Comment No. 17, supranote 138, 1 36-38.
161.
General Comment No. 18, supranote 138, 1 30.
162.
General Comment No. 19, supranote 140,
53-55.
163.
It could be argued, for instance, that each state only has an obligation to
cooperate with other states and international organisations to realise economic, social,
and cultural rights at home. Such an obligation would imply that a state has to accept
food aid offered bi- or multilaterally in case of a domestic crisis, but not that a state has
to provide food aid in case another state suffers from hunger.
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application to the territory or jurisdiction of states parties. 164 Its text
is hence open as to the geographical scope of states parties'
obligations and may be read as extending to all acts of a state
irrespective of where they may be taken or having effect. 165 However,
the object and purpose of the ICESCR is not to create a confusing and
vague web of unclear relationships of rights and duties between
individuals and all other states parties, but primarily to establish
clear rights-and-duty relationships between a governing authority
and those governed or affected in another specifically direct way. 166
Moreover, and most significantly, the CESCR's approach does
not take into account the context of human rights law in general,
which is based on a spatial separation of spheres of obligations that
are normally demarcated based on territorial jurisdiction. 167 Also, in
terms of context, the draft optional protocol to the ICESCR limits the
right to submit communications to individuals or groups under the
jurisdiction of a state party, 168 another indication that extraterritorial
obligations are not as far-reaching as suggested in some of the
CESCR's General Comments. States parties also continue to report
only with respect to their territory, so that no subsequent practice in
the sense of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention has
developed. 169 Finally, the International Court of Justice, in its
advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 170 in contrast with the
CESCR, viewed the obligations of the Covenant as "essentially
171
territorial."
In sum, the object and purpose and, even more so, the context of
the ICESCR speak against the assumption of the wide-ranging
extraterritorial obligations proposed by the CESCR. Neglect of these

164.
For an example of such a clause, see ICCPR, supranote 19, art. 2.
165.
For a discussion of the scope of treaty obligations, see M. Craven, Human
Rights in the Realm of Order: Sanctions and Extraterritoriality,in EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 233, 251 (Fons Coomans & Menno T.
Kamminga eds., 2004).
166.
Cf. General Comment No. 3, supra note 148,
9 (noting that the "overall
objective" of the ICESCR "is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect
of the full realization of the rights in question").
167.
Craven, supranote 165, at 252.
168.
U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 8/2, supra note 7, art. 2.
169.
See supra Part II.A.
170.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 180 (July 9).
171.
The ICJ subsequently endorsed the application of the ICESCR to the
Occupied Palestinian Territories but does not support extraterritorial obligations in
general. Interestingly, the ICJ is also reserved concerning the extraterritorial
application of the ICCPR. While it relies on the HRC's concluding observations on
Israel, it does not cite its General Comment No. 31, in which the HRC clearly states
that, in contrast to the text of Article 2 of the ICCPR, according to which the treaty is
applicable to individuals on the territory and under the jurisdiction of a state party,
this provision should be read as on the territory or under the jurisdiction.
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two essential methodological elements of interpretation has created a
situation in which the scope of states parties' obligations has become
unclear. This result undermines the requirements of legal certainty
and the rule of law in a dangerous manner. Given the importance of
the topic and the difficult questions it raises, the CESCR would have
done better to dedicate a specific General Comment to a systematic
and analytical treatment of the question of the existence and extent
of extraterritorial obligations under the ICESCR, instead of inserting
short and rather cryptic paragraphs in selected General Comments
that appear to be motivated more by good intentions than rigorous
analysis. As the scope of extraterritorial obligations is a distinctly
legal question, the findings in such a General Comment should be
reached by clearly applying legal rules of interpretation. If the
CESCR took such an approach, it would also stand a much better
chance of convincing other human rights actors to endorse its findings
and follow its lead.
C. The Object and Purpose of the ICESCR and the Expansion
of the Concept of "Core Obligations"
The last example that demonstrates the importance of using the
method set out by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
focuses on the central methodological requirement of taking into the
account the object and purpose of a treaty when interpreting it. The
example used is the occasional occurrence of a very far-reaching
variant of the concept of core obligations. This concept renders
compliance with the ICESCR impossible for many poorer countries.
It therefore conflicts with the object and purpose of the ICESCR,
which is to provide a framework for all states parties, including
The CESCR's unconvincing
poorer developing countries. 172
treatment of such a central issue, which is relevant for every right
protected under the ICESCR, undermines the persuasiveness of its
General Comments, which, in turn, weakens the validity of the
CESCR's views, not only concerning this question but also generally.
The CESCR introduced the concept of minimum core obligations
in General Comment No. 3 on the Nature of States Parties'
Initially, the concept was well defined, properly
Obligations. 173
confined, and clearly related to the object and purpose of the ICESCR.
General Comment No. 3 established that "a minimum core obligation
to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential
174
levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party.
The core obligation would comprise access to "essential foodstuffs,....

172.
173.
174.

See ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 26(i).
General Comment No. 3, supra note 148,
Id.

10.
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essential primary health care, . . . basic shelter and housing, or . . .
the most basic forms of education. 1 75 If a state wanted "to attribute
its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of
available resources, it must demonstrate that every effort has been
made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to
'176
satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.
Originally, minimum core obligations related therefore to true
essentials; and even where those were not provided, states could
justify their noncompliance by pointing to a lack of resources if
certain stringent conditions were met. In support of core obligations
the Committee stated that, without them, the ICESCR would be
deprived of its raison d'tre.177 The CESCR thus based a convincing
argument on an analysis of the object and purpose of the ICESCR,
the text and context of which are open to such an interpretation. It
made it impossible for states parties to argue that complete disregard
for some rights was justified by focusing efforts exclusively on the
realization of others.
The CESCR used the concept of core obligations again in General
Comment No. 12 on the Right to Food, stating rather concisely that
"States have a core obligation to take the necessary action to mitigate
and alleviate hunger ...
even in times of natural or other
disasters."17 8 Since then, inconsistent and at times very far-reaching
characterizations of the concept of core obligations can be found in
five of the six General Comments adopted since 2000:179
inconsistencies arise with regard to the question of whether core
obligations have immediate effect and with regard to the
consequences of noncompliance with them. Even though General
Comments No. 15 on the Right to Water 80 and No. 17 on Authors'
Rights 8 1 hold that core obligations are of immediate effect and hence
not subject to progressive realization,18 2 General Comments No. 14 on
the Right to Health, 8 3 No. 18 on the Right to Work,18 4 and No. 19 on
Social Security18 5 do not include core obligations in their lists of
immediate obligations. In addition, General Comments No. 14 and

175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
178.
General Comment No. 12, supra note 119, 6.
179.
By contrast, General Comment No. 16 on "the equal right of men and
women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights" does not use the
concept. General Comment No. 16, supra note 137.
180.
General Comment No. 15, supra note 121, 37.
181.
General Comment No. 17, supra note 138, 25.
182.
General Comment No. 15, supra note 121, 37.
183.
General Comment No. 14, supra note 136, 30.
184.
General Comment No. 18, supra note 138, 19.
185.
General Comment No. 19, supra note 140, 40.
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No. 15 declare that noncompliance cannot be justified at all,18 6 but
this is no longer stated in General Comments No. 17 and No. 18.187
On the contrary, in General Comment No. 19 the CESCR explicitly
repeats the formula originally developed in General Comment
No. 3188 that a state can attribute a failure to meet minimum core
obligations to a lack of available resources, if it can demonstrate that
every effort has been made to use all resources at its disposal in an
189
effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, these minimum obligations.
The CESCR does not provide any explanation for these
inconsistencies. It neither links its interpretations to the text,
context, or object and purpose of the ICESCR, nor does it discuss the
role of immediate core obligations in relation to the concept of
progressive realization, which indicates how little attention the
CESCR has paid to Articles 31 and 32 when developing its approach
and demonstrates how such neglect leads to weak and contestable
results. 19 0

Particularly problematic with respect to the object and purpose
of the ICESCR is the combination of two of the suggested
characteristics: the requirement of immediate fulfillment and the

impossibility of justifying noncompliance (for instance, in General
Comment No. 15). The text of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR establishes
as the main obligation under the ICESCR the obligation to realize the
This central obligation is
protected rights progressively. 19 1

47; General Comment No. 15,
186.
General Comment No. 14, supra note 136,
supra note 121, 40.
41; General Comment No. 18,
187.
General Comment No. 17, supra note 138,
supranote 138, 32.
188.
General Comment No. 3, supra note 148, 10.
60. The CESCR has also
189.
General Comment No. 19, supra note 148,
broadened the substantive scope of the concept by including rather extensive lists of
core obligations. In General Comment No. 14, the CESCR identified six core obligations
and five obligations of "comparable priority." General Comment No. 14, supra note 136,
43. In General Comment No. 15, it lists nine core obligations, General Comment No.
15, supra note 121,
37; in General Comment No. 17, five, General Comment No. 17,
supra note 138,
39; in General Comment No. 18, three, General Comment No. 18,
31; and in General Comment No. 19, six, General Comment No. 19,
supra note 138,
59. In addition, whereas their nature was originally purely resultssupra note 140,
focused ("satisfaction of minimum essential levels"), it now covers also specific policy
measures such as to adopt and implement national strategies and plans of action,
General Comment No. 14, supra note 136, 43(0; General Comment No. 15, supra note
31(c); General Comment No.
121, 37(0; General Comment No. 18, supra note 138,
19, supra note 140,
59(d), or to monitor the extent of the realisation of a right,
General Comment No. 15, supra note 121, 37(g); General Comment No. 19, supra note
140, 59(0.
190.
It should be noted that the obligations under the ICESCR are all based on
Article 2 of the ICESCR and are structurally identical, so that the variations from one
General Comment to the next cannot be explained away by the fact that they refer to
the protection of different rights.
191.
In General Comment No. 17 on Authors' Rights, one of the core obligations
is identical to the main obligation of states parties as stated in the text of the ICESCR,
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that
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Moreover,
one.
an
immediate
into
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resource
significant
carry
that
obligations
noncompliance with
implications cannot be justified under any circumstances is difficult
to reconcile with the object and purpose of the ICESCR. This object
and purpose is to set up a framework that obliges states to do what
they can to realize the rights protected. It is not to impose obligations
that cannot realistically be met immediately because of their
Given the principle
significant financial implications. 1 93

which raises the question whether there is any special characteristic of the so-called
core obligations: Art. 15(I)(c) of the ICESCR obliges states parties to recognise the right
of everyone "[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he is the author."
ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 15. According to Art. 2(1) ICESCR, each state party
"undertakes to take steps ... with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognised in the [ICESCR] by all appropriate means, including . . .
adoption of legislative measures." Id. art. 2(1). According to General Comment No. 17,
states have a core obligation "to take legislative and other necessary steps to ensure
the effective protection of the moral and material interests of the author." General
Comment No. 17, supra note 138, T 39(a).
192.
See ICESCR, supra note 17, art. 2(1).
193.
According to General Comment No. 15, states parties have, for instance, a
core obligation
To adopt and implement a national water strategy and plan of action
addressing the whole population[.] [T]he strategy and plan of action should be
devised, and periodically reviewed, on the basis of a participatory and
transparent process; it should include methods, such as right to water
indicators and benchmarks, by which progress can be closely monitored; [and]
the process by which the strategy and plan of action are devised, as well as
their content, shall give particular attention to all disadvantaged or
marginalized groups.
37(f). To immediately fulfill the
General Comment No. 15, supra note 121,
requirements of this "core obligation" is a tall order for many developing countries in
which access to clean drinking water as such is a problem. Such countries will find it
difficult to immediately establish indicators and benchmarks, gather enough
disaggregated information from every part of their country to monitor progress with
particular regard to different disadvantaged and marginalized groups, and develop
strategies and plans of action in a transparent and participatory manner. It should also
be noted that the CESCR, together with other human rights bodies, is itself still
developing indicators for the realization of the different rights protected under the
ICESCR. Hence, the question which indicators measure best the realization of each of
the rights has not yet been settled conclusively. Many of the mentioned "obligations"
would have been better formulated as policy options strongly recommended by the
CESCR, given that states have been able to fulfill the right to water without taking the
specific approach the CESCR proposes. For relevant examples of initiatives on
indicators, see the IBSA project on right to food indicators carried out by CESCR
member Professor Eibe Riedel at the University of Mannheim, http://ibsa.unimannheim.de/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2009), the development of right to water indicators
by the NGO Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, VIRGINIA ROAF, ASHFAQ
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impossibilium nulla obligatio est, core obligations under the ICESCR
simply cannot be interpreted in a way that is impossible to fulfill,
which would be the case if immediate compliance were mandated,
with no possible justification for noncompliance. It is noteworthy
that states parties regularly continue to ascribe the nonimplementation of what the CESCR calls "core obligations" to a lack
of available resources, 194 so that no evidence of agreement exists to
support the variant strand of the CESCR reasoning that combines
immediate effect of core obligations with the impossibility of
justifying nonfulfillment. States' ignoring of this variation of core
obligations also demonstrates how strongly the treaty bodies rely on
the persuasiveness of their work. Applying the method laid down in
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention and, in particular,
paying more attention to the object and purpose of the ICESCR would
have avoided this unsatisfactory and unconvincing result, and the
inconsistent treatment of the concept of core obligations by the
CESCR. Most likely, it would have resulted in a concept more akin to
the balanced one used in General Comments No. 3 and No. 19, which
focus on the realization of a core of every right and true essentials,
and which provides highly useful guidance to states. 195
The CESCR's treatment of core obligations also offers an
example of the extent to which the impact of the treaty bodies' output
depends on its persuasiveness and analytical rigor. In the Grootboom
judgment, the South African Constitutional Court declined to use the
concept of core obligations because of difficulties of determining
minimum core content. 196 The Court pointed out that the floor
beneath which the realization of a right might not fall would depend
on factors such as the economic and social history of a country, its
current circumstances, the prevalence of poverty, the availability of
land, the degree of unemployment, and the fact of whether an

KHALFAN & MALCOLM LANGFORD,
MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF

CENTRE OF HOUSING RIGHTS AND EVICTIONS,
THE RIGHT TO WATER: A FRAMEWORK FOR

DEVELOPING INDICATORS 3 (2005), available at http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/
right%20to%20water%20-%20indicators%20framework.pdf, and the OHCHR's own
work, Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Report on Indicators for
Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights Instruments, UN Doc.
HRI/MC/2006/7 (May 11, 2006). By requiring states parties to use indicators, the
CESCR imposes an obligation which it might have difficulty fulfilling itself.
194.
See, e.g., CESCR, Second Periodic Report by Nepal-Addendum, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/NPL2, at 73 (Aug. 7, 2006); CESCR, Second Periodic Report by BeninAddendum, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/BEN/2, at 62, 63 (Mar. 30, 2007).
195.
See General Comment No. 3, supra note 148,
10 (describing core
obligations as entailing access to essential needs, while providing a means of justifying
noncompliance that may result from a lack of avilable resources); General Comment
No. 19, supra note 140,
59, 60 (suggesting that the concepts of core obligations
refers to the satisfaction of minimum essential levels of each of the rights of the
ICESCR and reiterating the justification language of General Comment No. 3).
196.
Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v. Grootboom, 2000
(11) BCLR 1169 (CC), 32 (S. Mr.).
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individual lived in an urban or rural environment. 197 Moreover, and
even more importantly, it added that the state is not obliged to go
beyond available resources, 198 and that it is impossible to give
everyone access to a core service immediately. 199 In contrast to the
CESCR, the court thereby interpreted the South African Constitution
as not obliging the state to do what would be impossible to do. A
synchronous interpretation of human rights obligations by a treaty
body and national courts, which is not necessary but is strongly
desirable, had become impossible.

V.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The treaty bodies fulfill a unique function in the global human
They develop the substantive content of rights;
rights system.
supervise states parties' compliance with treaty obligations; serve an
instrumental role in promoting global human rights standards; feed
into the work of the Charter bodies, regional human rights bodies,
and domestic actors; and contribute to the formation of customary
Their activities range from entertaining an
international law.
ongoing dialogue with states to issuing General Comments, in which
they set out the meaning of human rights and offer options for their
realization.
Among the committees' most important functions is the
interpretation of the rights granted and the obligations imposed by a
treaty. While an exclusively legal approach might not be helpful in
carrying out all the functions of a treaty body, showing respect for
legal rules of interpretation is vital for this function. Given that
significant legal expertise is represented on the committees, they are
well equipped to apply the customary international legal method of
interpretation codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention. Because the treaty bodies are charged with interpreting
treaties of international law largely in lieu of state parties, they are
also bound to apply these rules when carrying out interpretative
functions which come into play with respect to each of the treaty
bodies' three main functions. In addition, good substantive reasons
exist to do so.
the
compromise
weaknesses
methodological
First,
comprehensibility, consistency, rationality, and legitimacy of a

Id.
197.
94; Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign &
198.
Id.
Others, 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC), 32 (S. Afr.).
Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others, 2002
199.
35 (S. Afr.). The Court regarded, however, the minimum core
(10) BCLR 1033 (CC),
as relevant in the determination of what constitutes a reasonable measure, which is
the standard required by the South African Constitution.
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committee's output, as the detailed discussion of the three examples
from the work of the CESCR has shown. Such weaknesses call into
question a treaty body's rigor of analysis and thereby weaken legal
certainty. Lack of clearly discernible method means how a committee
has reached its conclusions cannot be reconstructed, and its future
approaches cannot be predicted. This result weakens both the work
of the committees and the authority of the treaties they interpret.
Second, clear consideration of the text, context, and object and
purpose of a treaty facilitates the development of a coherent body of
interpretation of the rights and obligations under a human rights
treaty. As the treatment of obligations of international organizations,
extraterritorial obligations, and core obligations has shown, lack of
coherence weakens a treaty body's overall argument, especially if
changes appear to be introduced at random and are not explained.
Third, disregard for rules of interpretation raises the question of
where a committee draws the line between interpreting a treaty and
developing new law for which it does not have a mandate. Although
playing a general promotional role is part of a treaty body's overall
mandate and contributes to the realization of human rights, a
conflation of the promotion and the interpretation of rights and
obligations endangers the credibility and significance of the treaty
body monitoring system, which depends on the persuasiveness of its
output. As Steiner points out, the influence of a treaty body will rest
primarily on the quality of its argument and on the degree to which it
expounds the respective treaty in a serious, probing, and illuminating
way.200

Given the absence of a world human rights court, treaty bodies
should follow the example of many state constitutional courts, as far
as substantive deliberations and argumentative cohesiveness are
concerned-especially when writing their General Comments and
hearing individual communications. 20 1
The more they rely on
extensive argument and justification based on clear methodological
grounds to reach their conclusions, and work as truly deliberative
bodies, the better they can convince other human rights actors to
follow their lead. Such change would involve clearly distinguishing
between
obligations
and
desirable
policy
options.
In
recommendations concerning policy options, the treaty bodies can
advance human rights by making forward-looking suggestions based
on best practices as discerned through their monitoring work, without

200.
Steiner, supra note 25, at 49 (referring to the HRC and the ICCPR); see also
wa Mutua, supra note 110, at 231 (suggesting that "improv[ing] the quality of General
Comments by making them more substantial arguments . .. including analyses and
references to leading authorities would raise the prestige of the HRC").
201.
See also Steiner, supra note 25, at 18-19. While the nature of the treaty
bodies will make it very difficult to achieve the same legal precision as courts, much
stronger adhesion to legal interpretative standards is achievable.
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compromising the integrity of their interpretative role by conflating
obligations and recommendations. The CESCR, for instance, accepts
that the Covenant does not formally oblige states to incorporate its
provisions in domestic law, but it strongly encourages formal
adoption or incorporation in national law. 20 2 Such an approach will
ultimately strengthen human rights law by contributing to clearly
circumscribing rights and obligations, instead of risking weakening
human rights law by blurring the line between existing obligations
and desirable future developments. In this way they could also best
profit from their diversity in membership: while the techniques of
interpretation should be legal, the interpretative content to be given
to human rights and policy recommendations will have to be informed
by the expertise of other disciplines so that social, economic, and
developmental considerations come into play.
Finally, developing the unique role of the treaty bodies by
strengthening the legal aspects of their work, by moving from
statement to argument, and by distinguishing clearly policy and law,
would increase the degree to which their technical and legal work and
the political work of other human rights bodies-such as the Human
Rights Council-complement each other, and would thereby serve the
larger purpose of developing the human rights system as a whole.

According to the CESCR, "[d]irect incorporation avoids problems that might
202.
arise in the translation of treaty obligations into national law, and provides a basis for
the direct invocation of the [ICESCR's] rights by individuals in national courts."
General Comment No. 9, supranote 60, IT 5, 8.

